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Abstract
There is a growing concern and awareness about the right-
to-be-forgotten issues among regulators as well as users all
over the world. To cope with these privacy concerns, social
platforms offer deletion mechanisms that give the users the
opportunity to remove their contents and in some cases the
platforms remove them automatically. However, this leaves
the users vulnerable to attacks by adversaries who specifically
seek the damaging content of the users and exploit the act of
deletion as a strong signal for it.
In this paper, we conduct a user study on 191 participants
to study their prior deletion experiences, their expectations
of deletion privacy, and how effective do they find the cur-
rent deletion mechanisms. We find that more than 80% of
the users have deleted at least a social media post and 35%
of the deletions happened after a week of posting. While the
participants identified the irrelevancy of the content due to
time passing as the main reason for removing their contents, a
majority of the participant believe that deletions indicate that
the deleted content includes some damaging information to
the owner. Importantly, the participants are significantly more
concerned about their deletions being noticed by large-scale
data collectors (e.g., a third-party data collecting company or
the government) than any other individual from their social
circle. Further, a third of the participants think that they can
be attacked by these large-scale data collectors. Finally, the
participants find the current deletion mechanisms to be inade-
quate in protecting the privacy of their deletions and provide
guidelines for the future of deletion mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Today, billions of internet users share hundreds of billions of
pieces of their personal content (including life events, images,
and opinions) on social platforms like Facebook or Twitter.
A recent Pew Research study [2] finds that seven out of ten
American adults use some kind of social platform. As these
platforms archive a significant number of personal posts over
the years, the often-personal nature of this social content does
make the users uncomfortable at times. Such discomfort may
originate over time from regret about posting inappropriate
social content, embarrassment, or even life or relationship
changes [17, 18, 32, 35, 36].
Almost all of the social platforms thus offer some mecha-
nism to its users for retrospectively remove their unwanted
posts, and the users enthusiastically employ this selective dele-
tion mechanism—around one-third of more than six-year-old
posts are withdrawn from Twitter by 2016 [28, 29]. However,
these selective deletions also create a catch-22 situation—
deletions (meant to remove a post from the platform), in
practice might bring unwanted attention to deleted posts
and make them more visible to an onlooker. Many web ser-
vices (e.g., Politwoops [7] for Twitter, Removeddit [9] for
Reddit, StackPrinter-Deleted [11] for Stack overflow, and
YouTomb [1]) collect and hoard specific deleted posts from
the users of social platforms. The existence of such services
is intuitively expected—due to the open and social nature of
these platforms, it is relatively easier to collect snapshots and
thus identify deleted social content. Further, this social content
(by virtue of being selectively deleted) might already contain
embarrassing or potentially damaging content. Indeed, a line
of work identifies the phenomena of leveraging deletion as a
signal to unearth potentially sensitive content as a violation of
“deletion privacy” [12, 25, 26, 34, 36], and there are already a
number of deployed as well as academic removal mechanisms
devoted to preserving deletion privacy [5, 6, 10, 25, 26].
From analyzing these mechanisms, we observe that pre-
serving deletion privacy involves designing and enforcing
access control rules to regulate when and how information
about the deletion events (and deleted content) is revealed to
others, and that earlier research did not investigate system-
atic access rules to regulate the discoverability of deletion
events. In general, there is no prior work on understanding the
need for providing deletion privacy to general social media
users. In other words, there was no evidence quantifying the
importance of preserving deletion privacy for social platform
users. This paper takes the first step towards understanding
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and operationalizing user perceptions of deletion privacy.
In our study, we collected quantitative and qualitative data
from 191 participants spanning both Europe and the US re-
garding their perceptions about deletion privacy. We first in-
vestigated the prior experiences of the participants regarding
their post deletions and corresponding deletion privacy expec-
tations. We then leverage the contextual integrity theory [30]
to identify key contextual factors (as perceived by users) for
regulating access and ensuring the preservation of deletion
privacy. Finally, we unearth the factors governing the useful-
ness of existing deletion privacy preservation mechanisms.
Specifically, we investigate the following research questions
(RQ).
RQ1: Do users ever faced violation of deletion privacy in
social platforms? In other words, did some other users or
organizations focused on their deleted social posts? How?
(Section 4.1)
We investigated this RQ by asking each participant detailed
questions regarding their experience about deletions on the
social platforms. We noted that 82% of our participants have
deleted some of their posts. Interestingly, 51% of the partici-
pants felt that a deleted post is indeed sensitive, damaging or
embarrassing to the uploader. Furthermore, 54 participants
had their deletions noticed in social platforms, and even within
our small sample of fewer than 200 participants, nine partici-
pants proclaimed that when their deletions were noticed by
others, it resulted in discomfort.
While establishing the need for deletion privacy was a
prime goal of this work, a social platform would also need to
know if users feel (un)comfortable in revealing their deletions
for specific contextual factors. We explore this question next.
RQ2: On what contextual factors (such as recipient) do
policies regarding acceptability of revealing deletion events
depend? How? (Section 4.2)
We use the contextual integrity theory [30] to create a set
of contextual variables (e.g., recipients) and enumerated pos-
sible values for each set of variables (e.g., family member,
friend, coworker, a company, government). We then collected
user feedback for combinations of all of those contextual vari-
ables in our survey. We observe that majority of the users
seek to preserve deletion privacy against large-scale data col-
lectors, but not so much against the family, friends, and even
co-workers.
Finally, we looked into the efficacy of the existing deletion-
privacy enhancing mechanisms. To that end, we ask:
RQ3: Are existing mechanisms useful for enhancing dele-
tion privacy? Why or why not? (Section 4.3)
We base this part of our study using four short videos.
Those videos explained the high-level functionalities of four
different deletion mechanisms. These mechanisms provide
varying guarantees to protect deletion privacy. Users find
selective deletions, the current deletion mechanism used by
most social platforms, to be ineffective in protecting deletion
privacy. The same users found other mechanisms more effec-
tive than selective deletion. However, they also identify the
shortcomings of these mechanisms. We provide a principled
analysis of the pros and cons of each of the existing mecha-
nisms via mining the user perception for our participants.
In Summary, we begin to quantify the need for deletion
privacy in social platforms with a 191 participant user survey.
Our contributions include:
1. Establishing a strong user-need for ensuring deletion
privacy in social platforms. Our results show for the first time
that users indeed care for deletion privacy.
2. Showing the context-dependency of the rules for preserv-
ing deletion privacy. We identify the key contextual factors
that future developers should consider to better align their
system functionalities with user expectations.
3. Identifying the key factors that led to the usefulness of
mechanisms to preserve deletion privacy. Future social plat-
form designers should consider these factors while providing
deletion privacy to their users.
2 Background and Related Work
We start with some background on our study. We divide the
earlier work in this field into four broad dimensions.
2.1 Deletion in Social Platforms
Deletion or the ability to remove content is a crucial function-
ality in social platforms—often needed due to social nature
of these platforms as well as personal nature of social content.
Earlier work studied in detail the reasons behind social con-
tent deletion. These reasons range from removing regrettable
content to removing content which became irrelevant over
time [24, 27, 28, 32, 35, 36]. However, even though deletion is
crucial and widely adopted, in some cases, the removal of a
post can be a simple and very effective indication about the
sensitive and/or damaging nature of that social content [25,26].
Thus simple removal might create an opportunity for an at-
tacker to potentially harass and blackmail the users. Such
deletion based surveillance is not only relevant to public fig-
ures, but also for normal social platform users, e.g., a French
Twitter account, @FallaitPasSuppr, identify and re-publishes
the deleted content of both French public figures as well as
normal users [3]. However, no earlier work investigated if this
shortcoming of social content deletion is truly affecting the
general populace. We fill this gap.
2.2 Social Content Deletion Mechanisms
We identify four key mechanisms (either practically deployed
or academic) for facilitating deletion in social platforms:
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Selective deletions: Majority of the social platforms today
provide a selective deletion mechanism–the posts are avail-
able on the platform until the user itself selects an unwanted
post and deletes it. However, as we mentioned earlier, selec-
tive deletion might attract unwanted attention to particular
posts [25].
Prescheduled deletions: This mechanism automatically
removes the users’ contents when a specific criterion has
been triggered (e.g., after a predefined time period or after
prolonged inactivity around post [29]), e.g., Snapchat and In-
stagram Stories support this feature (e.g., delete content after
24 hours of posting). Prescheduled deletions ensure that an
adversary cannot single out specific deletions to find damag-
ing content (since all content will be deleted). However, on
the down side, this mechanism removes everything, implying
there will not be any archive of social content for users to
reminiscence.
Intermittent withdrawal: Intermittent withdrawal [25]
offers a deniability guarantee for the users’ deletions in the
form of an availability-privacy tradeoff. In this mechanism,
all of the non-deleted posts are intermittently hidden for some
amount of time. This hiding confuses an adversary while
deciding if an unavailable post is deleted by the user or just
temporarily hidden by the platform.
Decoy deletions: In the decoy deletions [26] mechanism,
given a set of sensitive/damaging posts that users want to
delete, the system selects k additional non-sensitive/non-
damaging posts for each sensitive/damaging post and deletes
them along with the damaging posts. The system-selected
posts (decoy posts) are taken from a pool of non-damaging
non-deleted posts provided by volunteers. Decoy deletions
raises the bar for the adversary to identify deleted posts as
they need to identify the sensitive or damaging post among
the k+1 deleted posts.
We note that, interestingly, earlier work on these mecha-
nisms does not answer two fundamental questions. First, is
preserving deletion privacy important for the users? If yes,
how effective are these mechanisms to protect deletion pri-
vacy. We aim to answer these questions.
2.3 Deletion privacy as Contextual Integrity
Contextual Integrity (CI) [30] theory provides a systematic
framework for studying privacy norms and expectations. CI
defines privacy as appropriate flows of information. Each in-
formation flow consists of five parameters about the informa-
tion: subject, sender, recipient, information type (or attribute),
and transmission principle. The appropriate information flows
conform to the socially acceptable values of these parameters.
Earlier work demonstrated that we can infer privacy norms
(i.e., rules regulating acceptable information flow) by measur-
ing the acceptability of different information flows (created
with varying combination of CI parameter values) [14, 15].
For example, users in general might be comfortable when
a fitness tracker (sender) sends user’s heart rate (attribute)
to the doctor (recipient) to monitor the health status (trans-
mission principle), but uncomfortable if the recipient were a
health insurance provider.
In this paper, we aimed to unearth effect of context on the
acceptability of revealing deletion events (RQ2). Thus, we
leveraged CI to systematically unroll the contextual factors in
the scope of deletion privacy. We selected the CI parameter
values relevant to deletion privacy by surveying earlier work
and conducting pilot studies. Table 1 contains the full list of
our CI parameter values. Note that, this list is not exhaustive.
However, as a first, it does cover a range of information flows
in the scope of deletion privacy and demonstrate the generality
of our approach. Section 3.1 details the exact questions asked
in our survey. Next we present our CI parameter values.
Sender & Subjects for each deletion, the sender of the
information flow will be the user itself. However, a deleted
post can have different subjects. We consider prior work on
ego networks and social circles to design four distinct subjects
[16, 19]—(i) the user, (ii) family members, (iii) friends, (iv)
coworkers/acquaintance. We also included “not specifying a
subject” as null i.e., control condition.
Recipients for social content deletion is the individual (or
organization) that notices the user’s deletion. We include
users’ social circles in our list recipients along with two other
entities–a company that collects and archives the deletions of
the users and the government.
Transmission Principles in this scenario is the method
that a recipient uses to discover the deletion. We consider three
discovery methods—(i) discovery due to checking/observing
the user profile regularly to observe any change in the user’s
profile (ii) discovery due to an interaction with the post (e.g.,
liking, commenting, reposting, sharing, etc.), (iii) not specify-
ing a discovery method (null i.e., control condition).
Attributes, we consider the reason of the deletion to be
the attribute in the information flows. We adapt the categories
defined by Zhou et al. [37] for the regrettable deleted tweets
as attributes. We further add “fixing spelling/grammar” from
earlier work [13] as well as two other reasons—“post did
not get enough attention” and “being irrelevant due to time
passing” based on our study pilot. We obtained feedback
on acceptability for each of the information flows generated
using the combination of all of these CI parameter values.
3 Methodology
Next, we start with presenting our survey-based methodology
of understanding the need for deletion privacy and unrolling
the deletion privacy norms using Contextual integrity.
3.1 Survey Instrument
Our survey instrument has two parts. First, we asked questions
about users’ experience with content deletions and deletion
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Table 1: Contextual integrity (CI) parameter values used to generate information flow of deletion events
Sender Transmission Principle
user itself because they were checking/observing your user profile regularly
Subject because they were mentioned in the post or interacted with the post
that contained some information about yourself null
that contained some information about your family members Attributes
that contained some information about your friends Post did not get enough attention
that contained some information about your coworkers Fixing Spelling/Grammar
null Cleaning up profile for new job
Recipient Cleaning up profile for new relationship
your family member Racial/Religious/Political reason
your friend Being irrelevant due to time passing
your coworker/acquaintance Removing sexual content
a company Removing drug/alcohol related content
the government Removing violence/cursing related content
anyone Removing health related content
privacy in social platforms. Second we probed the effective-
ness and usefulness of different deletion mechanisms.
3.1.1 Part 1: Perceptions about Content Deletion
Part 1 of our survey contained two sections: (1) Experiences
about prior post deletions, (2) CI-parameter based question-
naire about deletion privacy.
Experiences about prior post deletions and deletion pri-
vacy (RQ1). We started by asking our participants about
the usage of different social platforms and whether they have
had deleted social content on any of them. We further asked
how old was the content at the time of deletion as well as the
reasons behind the deletion of that content. Then we asked
the participants to explain whether they have ever faced any
discomforts because of their deletions and if they have not,
what problems do they anticipate in the future. We then en-
quired if the participants are aware of other users noticing
their deletions and if they themselves noticed deletions by
other users. Then we investigated how the users feel about the
sensitivity of deleted social content by asking them–“when
someone deletes a social media post, it indicates that the con-
tent of that post is sensitive/damaging/embarrassing to that
individual.”
CI-based questionnaire: deletion privacy (RQ2). Next,
taking inspiration from earlier research [14, 15] we incor-
porated a part in our survey instrument to unearth the norms
governing deletion privacy in social platforms. CI was easily
adopted to deletion privacy and was proven to be useful in
identifying broad rules that govern the social perception of
privacy. We detailed our adaptation of CI to the scope of dele-
tion privacy in Section 2.3. In this section, we will focus on
the setup for our survey.
Recall that, we needed to obtain user perception of accept-
ability for all the information flows created by all combina-
tions of all the parameter values presented in Table 1. To
achieve this objective, we divided this section of our survey
into blocks of questions querying the acceptability of each of
Figure 1: Measuring acceptability of information flow
with a fixed subject (your coworkers), fixed transmission
principle (because they were checking/observing your
user profile regularly), fixed recipient (anyone) and vary-
ing attributes (not all are shown).
the information flows.
Each block contained information flows with the same
subject, same transmission principle, varying recipients, and
varying attributes. For example, one block contained all in-
formation flows with the subject “a post that contained some
information about your self” and the transmission principle
“because they were checking/observing your user profile regu-
larly”.
We randomly assigned each participant to a single question
block. Then, in a question block, we created one question
matrix for each of the recipients and all attributes. Thus the
rows of the question matrix signify the final information flows.
For each of those information flows we asked participants to
rate the acceptability of the flow using a five-point Likert
scale: Completely Acceptable, Somewhat Acceptable, Neu-
tral, Somewhat Unacceptable, Completely Unacceptable.
Figure 1 presents a part of a question block. This ex-
ample belongs to a block with the subject “your cowork-
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ers” and transmission principle “because they were check-
ing/observing your user profile regularly”. Then in the pre-
sented question matrix we fixed the recipient to “anyone” and
iterated through all the attributes to create final information
flows.
3.1.2 Part 2: Evaluating Efficacy of Deletion Mecha-
nisms (RQ3)
In the second part of the survey, we presented four dele-
tion mechanisms—“Selective deletions”, “Prescheduled dele-
tions”, “Intermittent Withdrawal”, and “Decoy deletions” (de-
tailed in Section 2.2). Participants evaluated the usefulness
of these mechanisms to preserve deletion privacy. We real-
ized that this part involves possible hypothetical scenarios
since some participants might never have used some of the
mechanisms. Thus we took a visual (audio and video) driven
approach to first educate users on these mechanisms. This
approach is similar to the ones used in prior work on familiar-
izing participants on novel authentication mechanisms [23].
We first present the users our threat model using a short
video. In this work we adapt the same threat model considered
in earlier work on deletion privacy–intermittent withdrawal
and decoy deletions [25,26]. In our threat model, the adversary
can observe the full social platform data. So, the adversary is
able to access the platform continuously and take snapshots
of the entire platform to identify the deleted posts. The goal
of the adversary is to correctly identify if any of the detected
deleted posts is damaging to the post-owner. Note that, our
threat model considers only a non-targeted attack on deletion
privacy (via collecting and analyzing deleted posts at a large-
scale), rather than targeted attack (e.g., via stalking). After
showing the video, we enquired them if they ever encountered
or thought of such an adversary.
Next, we presented short (1-2 minute) videos (with audio
and subtitles) for each of the deletion mechanisms. Following
each video, we asked our participants how effective do they
find the mechanism in hiding their damaging/sensitive posts
in the presence of the threat model. We also collected free-
form text responses from the participants explaining their
answers. To improve coverage, we also collected free-form
text responses (if they can think of) about other techniques that
can protect the users’ deletions in presence of the malicious
entity.
3.1.3 Quality control
In order to ensure the quality of responses, we incorporated
multiple attention check questions in the survey. In particular,
we repeated two of the multiple-choice questions in random
locations in the survey and compared the answers with their
previous response to the same question. Further, we added a
fake social platform named “Cybersocial” in the question that
asked about the usage of different social platforms. Monitor-
ing whether the respondents indicate that they have previously
used this fake platform or not. Further, we also used a time-
based filtering to ensure than the participants actually gave
attention while watching the videos in our survey.
3.2 Recruitment
We recruited our participants from Prolific Academic [8], a
platform regularly used for advertising academic surveys [31].
We screened participants to ensure they were 18 years old
or above, had taken a minimum of 50 prior surveys on the
platform, had a minimum approval rate of 95%, and fluency in
English. We posted the survey in multiple batches at different
times of the day and days of the week to ensure we were tar-
geting a range of potential respondents. We carefully avoided
priming participants by not using words like “security” or
“privacy” in our study.
We recruited participants into two waves. The average time
of completion was 25 minutes and compensation was $1.5
for each participant for each part of the survey. In total we
obtained 205 responses (103 from US and 102 from Europe)
for part one and 144 responses (93 from US and 51 from
Europe) for part 2 of our survey.
3.3 Participant Demographics
We discarded the responses that did not pass the validity
checks (Section 3.1.3), and left with 191 (93 from US and
98 from Europe) and 135 (85 from US and 50 from Europe)
participants for parts one and two respectively.
Our sample was nearly gender-balanced; 50.8% identified
as female, 47.6% as male, and 1.1% as other. Our participant
sample skewed young, with 26.7% between 18 and 24, 39.3%
between 25 and 34, 20.4% between 35 and 44, and 13.6% age
45 or older. Our participants were slightly more educated than
the general U.S. population [4], where 55% of the participants
either had a bachelor or a graduate degree. The median annual
household income of the participants was $40,000 - $59,999,
where the majority had an income of $20,000 - $39,999 (23%).
Despite the fact that participants in crowdsourcing platforms
(e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk and Prolific) are considered to
be tech-savvy [20], 67% of our participants reported that they
don’t have any background (e.g., study, work, etc) experience
in the IT field. We present the detailed demographics of our
population in Table 8.
The usage pattern of different social platforms by the partic-
ipants are shown in Figure 2. Our participants are active users
of popular social media platforms. We note that 74.9% of the
participants self-reported use of at least one social platform
daily and 91.1% use a platform at least once a week, showing
the suitability of the participants for this study. Facebook,
Youtube, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Twitter were the most
frequently used social platforms in our population.
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Facebook
YouTube
Instagram
Twitter
WhatsApp
Pinterest
Snapchat
LinkdIn
Reddit
Other
29
34
30
21
36
3
15
3
8
12
23
18
19
18
8
12
10
5
3
8
15
9
19
10
8
17
7
16
3
12
8
7
6
4
5
8
3
15
4
21
25
8
27
9
24
27
21
21
daily weekly monthly yearly don’t post/deleted account
Figure 2: The usage pattern (in percentage) of different
social platforms by the participants.
3.4 Analysis Method
Coding Free Text Answers. We coded free text answers
obtained from our survey to uncover the user perceptions.
In our analysis, two researchers independently coded free-
text responses using a shared codebook. Across questions,
Cohen’s κ (inter-rater agreement [22]) ranged from 0.7 to 1,
indicating substantial to perfect agreement. The coders met
to resolve disagreements and choose a final code.
Statistical Analysis. We leveraged statistical hypothesis test-
ing to investigate significant deletion privacy norms. Specifi-
cally, for such analysis, we converted five-point Likert scales
to the ordinal variable as follows: Completely Acceptable (2),
Somewhat Acceptable (1), Neutral (0), Somewhat Unaccept-
able (-1), Completely Unacceptable (-2). Unless otherwise
stated, we used the nonparametric Mann Whitney U test to
compare the responses across different groups. For all tests,
the level of significance (α) was 0.05 (adjusted using Bonfer-
roni multiple-testing correction).
3.5 Ethical Considerations
We have taken great care to adhere to principles of ethical
research. In the recruitment process, each participant was in-
formed the purpose of the study, that they can withdraw at any
time without giving any reasons, and that we would not store
any personally identifying information. We also informed the
participants about the estimated duration of the study and
their compensation in our consent form. Respondents who
did not consent were not allowed to proceed with the study.
Our study protocol was thoroughly examined and approved
by the lead author’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
3.6 Limitations
We used the Prolific Academic to recruit our participants
which might have resulted in younger and more tech-savvy
users. Moreover, as our survey and videos used English as a
language, we possibly also have a language as well as cultural
bias. However, since the majority of popular social platforms
today have a bias towards younger, English-speaking users,
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
after a week
1 - 7 days
1 - 24 hrs
2 min - 1 hr
less than 2 min
Figure 3: Self-reported percentage of deleted content re-
moved at different time periods after publishing the post
we strongly believe our study still captures the perceptions of
a very important part of the population. Future research could
validate and extend our findings to a more diverse sample.
4 Results
Now, we will present results of our exploration in deletion
privacy. We start with presenting results on the perceptions of
deletion privacy in our sample.
4.1 Unpacking Perceptions of Content Dele-
tion and Deletion Privacy (RQ1)
4.1.1 Many users delete their outdated posts
Among the 191 participants, a significant majority of 82%
(156) reported that they have deleted a post(s) in the past. 78%
report that they have deleted a post(s) from Facebook , 46%
from Instagram and 34% from Twitter. These numbers match
with earlier work on social content deletion [27, 33].
Further, the participants that reported deleting their posts
were asked to indicate how frequently they have deleted them
in different periods after publishing the post. The frequency
results are shown in Figure 3. We see that 24% of the deletions
are within less than a two minute period from the publishing
time (similar to [12] where they report 22% deletion after a
minute in Twitter) perhaps hinting as fixing misspeliing or
grammar.
The “2 minute - 1 hour”, “1 - 24 hours”, and “1 - 7 days”
periods have similar frequency percentages (11-16%). These
are time periods where possible feedbacks are given by the
users’ family/close friend group (that closely follow the user’s
activities), coworkers/social friends (that check on their ac-
quaintance’s activities daily), and a much larger audience
when posts go viral after a couple of days.
Interestingly, the largest category belongs to the deletions
“after a week” with more than one third (35%) of all the dele-
tions. This indicates that old posts on social platforms are not
necessarily ignored, and users actively care about them and
remove the unwanted ones.
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Table 2: Reasons of Deletion
Reasons # (%)
Being irrelevant due to time passing 100 (64%)
Fixing Spelling/Grammar/FactCheck 77 (49%)
Post did not get enough attention 46 (29%)
Cleaning up my profile for new relationship 36 (23%)
Cleaning up my profile for new job 36 (23%)
Removing drug/alcohol/sexual related content 18 (12%)
Removing Racial/Religious/Political content 15 (10%)
Removing due to controversy/harassment 13 (8%)
Removing violence/cursing related content 11 (7%)
Removing embarrassing content 10 (6%)
Removing health related content 8 (5%)
Personal reason 7 (4%)
Other 6 (4%)
4.1.2 Users delete their posts for non-obvious reasons
So far, we saw that over 80% of the participants have deleted
at least one of their posts within the social platforms. The
next question that comes to mind is what are the reasons
behind users’ deletions. We followed up with the 156 par-
ticipants (that had deleted a post before) and asked what
were the reasons behind their deletions. Nine different rea-
sons (shown in Table 2) were presented to them (taken from
previous works [13, 37] and pilot studies) and further given
an “other” option that they could have provided additional
ones in a free text box. After categorizing the text responses
we added four other reasons (i.e., “removing due to contro-
versy/harassment”, “removing embarrassing content”, “per-
sonal reason” and “other”) to the list.
The participants reported that the main reason for deleting
their posts was that posts became irrelevant as time passed
(i.e., 64% of the users). This highlights the fact that 35% of
deletions occurred after a week. About half of the participants
indicated the they have removed a post due to the obvious
reason of fixing spelling/grammar and factual checking. This
reason is in-line with the 24% of deletions happening within
a very short time of publishing (less than 2 minutes).
Looking at Table 2, we see that a significant number of
the participants have reported sensitive topics (drug, alcohol,
race, politics, carnal, violence, etc.) as their reason of deletion.
In addition, 23 of the participants (15%) self-reported that
they have deleted their posts to remove contents that were
embarrassing to them or caused some controversy and harass-
ment. This raises the question—Are deletions an indication
of hiding some sensitive or damaging content?
4.1.3 Majority of the users consider deletions as an in-
dication of hiding something sensitive
We asked the participants whether they agree or disagree
with the following statement—“when someone deletes a so-
Table 3: Users’ agreement with the statement—
“deletions indicate that the content of that post is
sensitive/damaging/embarrassing to that individual.”
Strongly agree 17 (9%)
Somewhat agree 81 (42%)
Neither agree nor disagree 45 (24%)
Somewhat disagree 35 (18%)
Strongly disagree 13 (7%)
Table 4: Reasons for considering deletions as sensi-
tive/damaging or not.
Reasons Agree
# (%)
Neutral
# (%)
Disagree
# (%)
Embarrassing, inap-
propriate, emotional
73 (74%) 4 (9%) 3 (6%)
Irrelevant, factCheck,
grammar, spelling
8 (8%) 12 (27%) 29 (60%)
Context dependent 2 (2%) 24 (53%) 14 (29%)
No attention 3 (3%) — 1 (2%)
Privacy 5 (5%) — 1 (2%)
Political 4 (4%) — —
Job related 6 (6%) — —
Racism 1 (1%) — —
Other 1 (1%) 5 (10%) 2 (4%)
cial media post, it indicates that the content of that post is
sensitive/damaging/embarrassing to that individual”. The par-
ticipant responses are shown in Table 3. More than half of
the participants to some degree agreed with the statement
and 25% disagreed with the statement. The remaining 24%
neither agreed nor disagreed.
The question was followed by asking the respondents to
give an example in support of their answer. We categorized
the reasoning and examples and present them in Table 4. 74%
of the respondents that considered deletions to contain some
sensitive/damaging content indicated that users delete their
posts as it contains some embarrassing, inappropriate, or emo-
tional content. For example, participant P29 wrote: “Someone
would probably delete posts that would be embarrassing or
legally damaging for the public to know about”.
On the other hand, we see that 60% of the participants
that disagreed with the statement see deletions as removing
irrelevant content or fixing grammatical and spelling mistakes
and therefore, containing no sensitive or damaging content.
For example, participant P61 wrote: “I’ve posted things that
looking back an hour later I just think are dumb, nothing
embarassing or offensive”.
More than half of the participants that did not agree nor
disagree with the statement indicated that it is dependent on
the context of the posts and can be considered either damag-
ing or non-damaging and hence, chose to be neutral about
the statement. For example, participant P15 wrote: ‘In some
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Table 5: Possible discomforts due to deletions.
Possible Discomforts # (%)
Minimum consequence 59 (33%)
Explaining/justifying/worried 49 (28%)
Publicizing/harassment/dislike 31 (17%)
Embarrassment/shame/insecure 25 (14%)
Loss of privacy 7 (4%)
Loss of archival value 2 (1%)
Other 5 (3%)
cases people delete posts because of potential negative con-
sequences that could arise from them. However, there have
been times in Facebook groups where I made an innocent
post asking for information, and then deleted the post when I
found the information myself via a group search.”.
4.1.4 Majority of the users anticipate some sort of a dis-
comfort due to others notice their deletions
We have seen that majority of the users consider deletions to
contain some sensitive, damaging, or embarrassing content.
To see if participants have had any negative experiences from
others noticing their deletions we asked them—“did you face
any issues/problems/discomforts due to others noticing your
deletions?”. Nine (17%) individuals among the 54 partici-
pants (i.e., their deletions was noticed by others) reported
some sort of a issue or discomfort. Participant P56 stated—
“It was an awkward conversation as I’d posted the post in a fit
of anger/stress and then felt differently a day or so later. My
friend wanted to talk about it and I didn’t.”.
To get a perspective about the potential issues and dis-
comforts that the users foresee on their future deletions,
we asked the participants—“Suppose you were to delete
one or more of your social media posts; What possible is-
sues/problems/discomforts do you think you might face if you
become aware of someone noticing your post deletion(s)?”
We categorized the responses into seven different cate-
gories shown in Table 5. One-third of the participants report
that there will be no to minimum consequences for others
noticing their deletions. However, the remaining 67% feel
that they will face some sort of discomfort. 28% report that
they will be needing to explain and justify the reasons that
they have deleted their posts, while 17% of the users think
that they will face some sort of harassment and dislike from
others noticing their deletions. Participant P18 wrote—“I
would probably receive potential backlash. Also, maybe I
might get some questioning, whether it is supposed to be funny
(like ironic), or serious”. In another example, Participant P40
wrote—“I could be banned from the platform or suffer some
kind of angry mob that follows me around pointing out my
socially unacceptable views”.
Loss of privacy was another discomfort that 7 of the partic-
ipants mentioned in their responses. For example, participant
Table 6: Number of participants that their post deletions
have been noticed by others and the number of partici-
pants that noticed others’ deletions.
Participant’s deletion
noticed by others
Participant noticed
others’ deletions
Deletion Notice
Yes 54 (35%) 130 (68%)
No 82 (53%) 60 (31%)
Don’t know 20 (13%) 1 (1%)
Social Circles [Who]
Family member 22 (41%) 22 (17%)
Friends 50 (93%) 91 (70%)
Coworkers/Acquaintances 12 (22%) 43 (33%)
Stranger 5 (9%) 55 (42%)
Prefer not to say — 2 (2%)
Medium of notification [How]
Checking profile proactively 27 (49%) 69 (53%)
Mentioned in the posts 10 (18%) 29 (22%)
Interaction with the post 9 (16%) 75 (58%)
Post sent to the user 3 (5%) 31 (24%)
Other 6 (11%) 3 (2%)
P93 stated—“I might be uncomfortable because that means
someone might be visiting my profile a lot and stalking it. This
would make me wary about the media I post.”, and participant
P70 wrote—“If someone I don’t know notices all the posts
that I have ever deleted I would become uncomfortable and I
would block them”.
This shows that although many users have not yet faced
any issues or problems because of their deletions, a signifi-
cant majority of them do think that their deletions can have
negative consequences for them.
4.1.5 Users underestimate who is noticing their deletions
Previously we saw that 82% of the participants reported
that they have deleted their posts in the past. To see if
these deletions have been noticed by anyone, we asked those
participants—“have you ever become aware of someone notic-
ing that you have deleted one of your posts?”. The results are
presented in Table 6. A significant minority of the participants
(i.e., 35%) became aware that someone noticed their deletions.
The remaining 65% either said no or didn’t know if someone
has noticed their deletions.
We repeated the question by changing the roles, meaning
that we asked the participants whether they have noticed any-
one deleting their posts. Among all the 191 participants 68%
(130) of them reported that they have notices someone’s dele-
tions. If we compare these two settings, we see that there is
a 33 percentage point (94%) difference between the users
perception of others noticing their deletions versus the reality.
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4.1.6 Who notices the deletions and how?
In the previous subsection, we observed that many social
platform users are aware of others’ deletions. Following this
observation, we set to answer who are the individuals that
are noticing the deletions and how? To affirmatively answer
these questions, we asked the participants (i.e., those that
have had their deletions noticed by someone) to identify the
social group(s) that have noticed their deletion and further ask
them to describe the scenario of the occurrence. Using the
participants’ descriptions, we categorized the 54 responses
into five categories of medium notification (i.e., the method
that the deletions have been noticed by different individuals).
Further, we also asked the participants (i.e., those that have
noticed someone else’s deletions) to specify whose deletions
they have noticed and how they became aware of it. The
results of these two sets of questions are presented in Table 6.
As shown in Table 6, the majority (93%) of the participants’
deletions were noticed by their friends group. Their family
members took second place by noticing 41% of the deletions.
Not surprisingly, a very small number (9%) of strangers no-
ticed the participants’ deletions.
Conversely, these percentage change for the case of the
participants noticing others deletions. Again, the friend group
stands out as the highest, however, with a lower percentage of
70%. Surprisingly, the second highest-ranked is the stranger
group that has 42% of the participants’ deletion notice (an
increase of 33 percentage points). This indicates that many
of the users’ deletions are being noticed by the others outside
of the users’ close social groups, however, the users are not
aware of it.
The next point to investigate is to see how the social plat-
form users become aware of the deletions. In the case of
others noticing the participants’ deletions, we see that almost
half of the cases was due to checking the participant’s profile
proactively (by the individual that noticed the deletions). The
next two most used mediums are being mentioned in the post
(i.e., the individual that noticed the deletion) and interacting
with the post (e.g., reposting, sharing, commenting, liking,
etc.).
For the case of the participant noticing other users’ dele-
tion, we see that in 58% of the instances, participants report
that they have noticed the other users’ deletion because they
have had some interaction with the deleted post. This shows a
significant difference with the previous case (i.e, other users
noticing the participants’ deletions). This points to the direc-
tion that users are not aware that the individuals that have
some sort of interaction with their posts are much more likely
to notice the deletion of the post.
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Figure 4: Average acceptability scores of information
flows grouped by recipients and subjects, transmission
principles, or attributes. Scores range from -2 (com-
pletely unacceptable) to 2 (completely acceptable).
4.2 Uncovering Contextual Norms of Deletion
Privacy (RQ2)
Next we analyze the data collected using the CI-driven ques-
tions. We visualize the average acceptability scores (using
heatmaps) of flows with the pair of recipient and subject,
transmission principle, or attribute in Figure 4.
4.2.1 Users demand deletion privacy against large-scale
data collectors
The average acceptability scores of information flows that
have “the government” as their recipient are mostly negative
(Figure 4). This indicates that most of the participants con-
sider these flows as “completely unacceptable” or “somewhat
unacceptable”. Although less severe, the same is true for “a
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company” as the recipient. In contrast, the average scores
of flows with the recipient “family members”, ”friends”, and
“coworkers” are all positive and mostly above one. This score
difference between flows with the large-scale data collectors
(governments and private companies) as recipients versus the
closely connected individuals (family, friends, and coworkers)
holds regardless of other CI parameters(information transmis-
sion principle, subject, attribute). On average, information
flows with large-scale data collectors as the recipient are 0.94
Likert-scale points more unacceptable than their other recipi-
ent counterparts (p < 0.00001).
This result provides the first quantitative evidence that so-
cial platform users are indeed concerned about their deletions
being noticed by third party services and state agencies. In
fact, the found data flows that end up to those recipients sig-
nificantly inappropriate. This result urges the social platform
developers to proactively create different deletion privacy
policies for different classes of recipients.
4.2.2 Majority of The Users’ Think their Deletions Are
Noticed Only by Their Family and Friends , And
They are OK with it
As we saw earlier in Table 6, participants reported that the
majority of their deletions were noticed by their family and
friends. However, they themselves have had noticed deletions
from many users outside of their close social groups. Once
again we see the same phenomena here. One of the choices
for the recipient of the deletion was “anyone”. As evident
from Figure 4, and following with a statistical test we see that
the distribution of the flows with “anyone” as the recipient
is the same as the flows with the recipient as “family” and
“friends”. We clearly see an underestimation of the users on
who is able to observe their deletions.
4.2.3 Deleted posts that are about the users themselves
need more protection
One of the CI parameters that we explored in this study is the
subject of the deleted posts. We performed a pairwise statisti-
cal test (i.e., 20 tests) between all the possible subjects (the
significant value was adjusted to 0.05/20) to see any signifi-
cant differences. The only post subject that has acceptability
scores with a different distribution than all other subjects is
the “user itself” (p < 0.002). This difference is shown in the
average scores, where the flows with the subject “user itself”
have a 0.35 Likert-scale point less acceptability.
4.2.4 Not knowing how deletions were noticed is less ac-
ceptable to the users
In Section 2.3, we defined two methods of noticing the dele-
tions (i.e., the transmission principle). We also considered
the null transmission principle where no discovery method is
specified to the participants. By statistically comparing the
distributions of the flows with the null transmission principle
versus the non-null transmission principles we see that there
is a significant difference (p < 0.00001). The mean of the null
transmission principle is 0.23 Likert-scale points smaller (less
acceptable) than the non-null transmission principles. This is
consistent with human desire for cognitive closure [21] that
not knowing how deletions were noticed is less acceptable.
4.2.5 Users want to hide their non-popular posts more
than any other post
The attribute parameter of the CI flows in this study corre-
sponds to the reasons for removing a post. We identified nine
different reasons for the deletions shown in Table 1. Similar
to the subject parameter, we performed a pairwise statistical
test (i.e., 72 tests) between all the attributes (the significant
value was adjusted to 0.05/72).
We found that the attributes “Fixing Spelling/Grammar”
and “Post did not get enough attention” is statistical signifi-
cantly different (p < 0.0001) than all other attributes. How-
ever, these two reasons are at the two ends of the accept-
ability scores, where the flows with the attribute “Fixing
Spelling/Grammar” have the highest average acceptability
score (0.98 on the Likert-scale points) and the flows with the
attribute “Post did not get enough attention” have the lowest
(0.24 on the Likert-scale points). We further analyzed this
low-score by checking the correlation between the scores
given by users who indeed self-reported deleting content for
that reason. Interestingly, for “Post did not get enough atten-
tion” the negative scores primarily came from people who
did not delete content because of that reason. This finding
hints at the fact that indeed our participants perceived digging
up forgotten posts by virtue of deletion as a serious violation
of the deletion privacy. In other word, the platforms should
consider providing stronger deletion privacy to non-popular
posts than popular posts.
4.2.6 Effect of demographics on deletion privacy
We considered different demographic categories (gender, age,
education, income, and marital status) to see their effect on the
scores of the information flows. We performed five compari-
son tests and set the threshold for significance to α = 0.05/5 =
0.01 to account for the Bonferroni multiple-testing correction.
Among the above demographics, all had some significant
difference (p < 0.01) as we explain below, except the in-
come category. We divided the participants into two groups
of higher household income ($80,000 and more) and lower
household income (less than $80,000). The statistical test
showed no significant difference between the two groups.
Female users and higher educated users are more con-
cerned about their deletions. The average score of the in-
formation flows labeled by the female participants is 0.51 on
the Likert-scale points and is significantly different from the
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average score of the male participants that scored an average
of 0.7 on the Likert-scale points. We observe a similar result
with the same average scores between the participants that
have a university degree (bachelors or graduate degrees) and
all other participants.
Younger participants (millennials and generation Z) are
less concerned about their deletions. We see that there is
a significant difference between the average scores of the
participants that identified themselves between the age of 18-
34 to all the older participants. The younger generation has a
higher acceptability score (0.65 Likert-scale points) compared
to the other participants with an average score of 0.46 on the
Likert-scale points.
Individuals that have ended their relationship in the past
are more conservative. We found that on average, individ-
uals that had identified their marital status as divorced or
separated had a lower acceptability score (0.22 Likert-scale
points) compared to the individuals that identified themselves
as single, never married, or in a current relationship (0.62
Likert-scale points).
4.2.7 Differences between the US and Europe
Coworkers are considered a closer social group in the US.
Observing Figure 6, we can see the differences between the
US and Europe when the recipient is a “coworker”. By ap-
plying the statistical test between the flows of the recipients
“coworker” and “family” for the US participants we see no sig-
nificant difference. However, considering the same conditions,
there is a significance difference in Europe (p < 0.00001).
The opposite is true when comparing the distribution of the
flow where recipient is “coworker” and “a company”. In this
case, there is no significant difference between the distribu-
tions in Europe but one exists for the US (p < 0.00001). We
conclude that in the US, individuals consider their coworkers
to be in a closer social group compared to European individu-
als.
Stalking is more of a concern in Europe. Earlier we saw
that users are much more comfortable if they know what trans-
mission principle (method of noticing the deletion) is used
to notice their deletions. However, we observe a difference
between the acceptability of the US users and European users
when looking at the transmission principle “checking and
observing the user profile regularly” (in other words stalk-
ing). We compared the scores that participants in the US
and Europe gave to the two defined transmissions separately.
We observe no significant difference between the two trans-
mission principles for the US participants. However, there
is a significant difference between checking/observing the
users’ profile regularly (stalking) and interacting with the
post in Europe (p < 0.00001). The stalking method is seen as
a less acceptable means of noticing the deletions compared
to noticing due to a prior interaction with a difference of 0.4
Likert-scale points.
4.3 Evaluating Deletion Mechanisms (RQ3)
So far, we established the need for deletion privacy and un-
covered norms of deletion privacy in social platforms. Now,
in this section, we will compare the utility of deletion mecha-
nisms for enhancing deletion privacy in presence of a large-
scale adversary. We start with checking if the participants
have ever experienced a negative scenario with the adversary
(Section 3.1.2).
4.3.1 Some users have been attacked by malicious enti-
ties
After explaining the malicious entity (detailed in Sec-
tion 3.1.2) to the participants via text and video, we asked
them—“Have you ever experienced a scenario where a mali-
cious entity who collects all deleted posts from a large number
of users caused any issues/problems/discomforts for you in
any of the social media platforms?”
95% of the participants responded with “No”; However,
35% of them think that this scenario is likely to happen to
them. 34% responded that they don’t think it is a likely sce-
nario, and the remaining 31% were unsure.
Unfortunately, most of the 5% of the individuals that had
a negative experience did not provide details to the incident.
However, Participant P70 wrote—“I saw one of my deleted
photos on a Pinterest account that was not mine. It seemed
like it was some kind of ad for earrings but it made me a
little uncomfortable.” In response to another question (use-
fulness of the Decoy deletion mechanism), Participant P36
wrote about an experience that one of his/her friend had in
encountering such an attacker—“ ...such malicious entities
surely exist. My friend was contacted by one and threatened
that the malicious entity would send pictures to his mother.
4.3.2 The current deletion mechanism used by many so-
cial platforms is ineffective
For each of the deletion mechanisms (explained in Sec-
tion 2.2): Selective deletions, Prescheduled deletions, Inter-
mittent Withdrawal, and Decoy deletions, a short video was
shown to the participants explaining the mechanism and its
characteristics. Next, they were asked—“In your opinion,
how effective is [Deletion Mechanism] in hiding your dam-
aging/sensitive posts in the presence of a malicious entity
who collects all deleted posts from a large number of users?”
We used a Likert scale for the responses: Not Effective at all
(0), Slightly Effective (1), Moderately Effective (2), Very Ef-
fective (3), Extremely Effective (4). The results are depicted
in Figure 5.
We statistically compared the effectiveness of different
deletion mechanisms by applying the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test to find the likelihood that these four groups of scores
come from the same distribution. We performed six (i.e.,
pairwise) such tests and set the threshold for significance to
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Figure 5: Effectiveness of deletion mechanisms
α = 0.05/6 = 0.008 to account for the Bonferroni multiple-
testing correction.
The results show that “Selective deletions” (i.e., the mech-
anism that is used by many social platforms today to delete
users’ posts) has a significantly different distribution from
all the other three mechanisms with a mean of 0.77 points
compared to the mean of 2.01–2.1. The remaining deletion
mechanisms do not have a significant difference.
4.3.3 What characteristics of the deletion mechanisms
are useful to users
In addition to the effectiveness question, in the form of free
text box, we asked each participant to describe cases where
the mechanisms might be useful and/or NOT useful to them.
After analyzing the responses we created the summarized the
mechanism characteristic to eight categories shown in Table 7
(with an additional “other” category omitted from the table)1.
The first four characteristics cover the positive aspects of
the deletion mechanisms and the second four characteris-
tics point out their shortcomings. In the previous section, we
observed that “Prescheduled Deletions”, “Intermittent With-
drawals”, and “Decoy Deletions” all have the same effec-
tiveness in terms of protecting the users’ damaging/sensitive
deletions. This point also resonates in the responses of the
usefulness questions. In all the three mechanisms, the ability
of removing sensitive content and maintaining the privacy
was noted as the highlight of the mechanism. However, as
we see in Table 7 each of these mechanisms have a particular
deficiency that may become a barrier for using them.
Prescheduled Deletions. For “Prescheduled Deletions”, par-
ticipants particularly disliked the fact that the platform will
not have an archive of their posts and eventually everything
is deleted. Participant P19 states: “It could be EFFECTIVE
(and thus, useful) because it would take care of the issue of
sensitive material being used maliciously. However, effective
doesn’t mean that I like the idea of it! It would NOT useful
because I like the idea of having access to my old content
1As the responses were given in free text form not all participants pointed
out both the cases (i.e., useful and not useful) and only pointed out one.
(great for memories, etc.) and do NOT like the idea of los-
ing it forever because of some system.” Similarly, participant
P9 remarks: “It wouldn’t be useful in a scenario in which I
wanted to be able to reference the content at a later date.”
Prior to the deployment of the survey, we suspected that the
lack of archive would be a concern for the users. Therefore,
in the survey we asked—“How important is it for you that
the social platform archives all your posts (new and old) and
gives you the ability to access/view them at any time?”. 74%
of the participants stated that having access to their own post
at a later time has some level of importance (24% extremely
important, 33% very important, 17% slightly important). The
remaining 26% was split between 15% neutral and 11% not
at all important.
We further asked—“How important is it for you that the
social platform archives all your posts (new and old) and
gives others (i.e., those who you have given permission to)
the ability to access/view them at any time?”. 44% of the
participants stated this statement has some level of importance
(9% extremely important, 14% very important, 21% slightly
important) to them. The remaining 56% was split between
26% neutral and 30% not at all important.
The results from this two question aligns with the results of
the usefulness question where the lack of archive in a platform
may prevent many users from using the platform.
Intermittent Withdrawal. In “Intermittent Withdrawal”,
all the non-deleted posts are intermittently hidden for some
amount of time by the system. Therefore, the users felt a lack
of control over their posts and profiles. Participant P15 said:
“This system could be useful if i made a sensitive post that I
later decided to delete. However, it could also be problematic
if a social platform randomly made an important post that
I needed my audience to see, invisible for a period of time.”
Further, participant P19 adds: “This sounds like the best way
to go about deleting posts. It might be useful because *I*
would still maintain control over when my sensitive post was
deleted (without involving other people’s posts). As for not
useful – there’s always the possibility that I might want to go
back to a post that was hidden, which would be frustrating if
I couldn’t find it.”
Decoy Deletions. In “Decoy Deletions”, for each damag-
ing/sensitive post, a set of decoy posts that are not damag-
ing/sensitive to their owners (other users in the system) are
selected to be deleted with the true damaging post. Resulting
a confusion on which of the posts in the deleted set is the
damaging/sensitive posts. Although many users seemed to
find this tactic effective and novel, the dependability on a pool
of decoy posts from other users prevents them from finding
the mechanism as useful. Participant P119 stated: “this tech-
nique could be very effective if you want to delete a post and
protect it from the entity. However it is hard too find the decoy
post.” Participant P60 added: “I think there would be some
concern by posters that there is not a large enough pool and
they would be scared to delete items.”
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Table 7: Deletion Mechanisms’ Characteristics.
Deletion Mechanism
Maintain
Privacy
User in
Control
Maintains
Archive
No Assistance
Needed No Privacy
Limited
User Control No Archive
Need of
Assistance
Selective Deletions 11 (8%) 28 (21%) 7 (5%) — 95 (70%) — — —
Prescheduled Deletions 63 (47%) — — — 18 (13%) 14 (10%) 56 (41%) —
Intermittent Withdrawals 77 (57%) 4 (3%) 7 (5%) 1 (1%) 23 (17%) 29 (21%) — —
Decoy Deletions 66 (49%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) — 15 (11%) 10 (7%) 9 (7%) 27 (20%)
Prior to the deployment of the survey, we suspected that the
construction of decoy pool may be a burden for some of the
users. Therefore, we asked the participants—“Imagine that
Decoy Deletions is available to you on a platform. Would you
be willing to offer some of your non-sensitive/non-damaging
posts that you won’t mind getting removed from your profile
to be added to the decoy pool in order to protect the sensi-
tive/damaging deletions of yourself and other users?”. 41%
of the participants responded Yes (12% definitely yes, 29%
probably yes), 39% of the participants responded No (13%
definitely no, 26% probably no), and the remaining 20% re-
sponded with “might or might not”. This shows that although
the construction of the decoy pool and the need of assistance
from other users is a concern for some users, there are a sig-
nificant number of participants that are willing to contribute
to the pool.
Selective Deletions. As we observed previously, “Selective
Deletions” was voted the least effective deletion mechanism
in protecting the damaging deletions of the users. However, in
the usefulness question we see that it holds a unique charac-
teristic that users admire. Giving the users full control of their
posts and profile seems to be a big advantage of this mech-
anism. Participant P46 stated: “It’s not effective at all but it
is however the most popular among the bunch listed. People
(even me) like to have full control over our social medias and
tweets. Regardless if a malicious bot tries to collect sensitive
information off of us.” To no surprise we see that in some
case users will sacrifice their privacy over the usability of the
system. This is an initial step towards discovering the needs
of the users and maintaining a balance between usability and
deletion privacy.
4.3.4 Future of deletion mechanisms
After presenting the four deletion mechanisms to the partici-
pants we ended this part of the survey by asking—“Can you
think of any other technique that can protect user deletions in
presence of the malicious entity mentioned above?”
In spite that many of the participants do not find any of
the deletion mechanisms to be very effective (Figure 5), 54%
(73 out of 135) stated that they cannot think of any other
technique for the protection of their techniques. Participant
P36 wrote—“I can’t think of any other technique because
although I know someone it happened to I never put much
thought into the process”.
Although some users couldn’t come up with any other tech-
niques, fortunately, the study shed some light to the problem
of the deletion privacy for them. Participant P47 wrote—“I
cannot think of any other techniques as this is a new concept
to me. I think that this is a very advanced capability, and has
the potential to affect users’ social media in ways that they
don’t necessarily expect.”. Also participant P19 stated—“I
really can’t think of any other techniques, but those shared
have given me some food for thought. Ultimately, I would like
to maintain control of when my content is deleted.”
Asking the users not to post regrettable content in the first
place may seem like a good first step. Indeed 14% (19 par-
ticipants) of the participant suggested the same point. For
example, participant P23 responded with—“To be honest I
think the best thing people can do is think before they post”,
and participant P83 added—“The best defense is don’t post
sensitive stuff”. Although it is an effective method, it is im-
practical. Users cannot accurately predict what content would
be damaging to them in the future (e.g., before applying for a
job position or after a relationship breakup).
Eight of the participants pointed out different proactive ap-
proaches, similar to [34,37]. In these proposals, multiple types
of classifiers (e.g., Neural Networks, Naive Bayes, etc.) detect
potential regrettable posts to proactively advise users before
the publication of posts. Participant P186 clearly explains the
proactive solution in his/her response—“Some kind of bot/AI
that, based on language and keywords, warn the user that
their post may be considered offensive or sensitive before they
post it in the first place meaning they can delete it before post-
ing.”. Although helpful in some cases, this proactive approach
cannot prevent users from publishing future-regrettable posts.
Eight participants pointed out that the best approach is that
the social platforms create some barrier for the malicious en-
tities that collect the users’ data in large-scale. For example,
participant P108 states—“Social networks could make efforts
to thwart bots and scrapers that collect posts and also moni-
tor profiles for deletions. Maybe IP limiting or some sort of
CAPTCHA style tech?.” Following the last remarks of the
user, ten other participants suggested a non-globalization of
the user data by making the accounts private and only allow-
ing the family members and close friends to view the posts.
We further received 17 responses that pointed back to one
of the deletion mechanisms that we already presented to them
(10 for Decoy, 5 for Prescheduled, and 2 for Intermittent with-
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drawal). Some reiterated the mechanism in their own words
and some provided extra features that they found helpful.
For the Prescheduled deletions, all five participants pointed
out that the mechanism should have some sort of a selective
archival procedure for at least the owner of the post. Partic-
ipants P16 goes one step further and requests for the avail-
ability of the post for those who have interacted with the
post as well—“Scheduled Privacy. After a certain period of
time/activity, all public posts automatically turn into private
posts that can only be viewed by the owner and those who
interacted with it.”
For the Decoy deletions, some of the participants men-
tioned that the users themselves may generate some random
and non-sensitive posts (or even posts that contradict the orig-
inal post) on their profiles and then at a later time deleting
them all together to confuse the adversary. In another exam-
ple, participants P55 and P60 mention that the post that needs
to be deleted should be hidden from the family members and
friends of the individual immediately and later using decoy
deletions the platform can remove it from the public (i.e.,
giving enough time for gathering good enough decoy posts to
be collected in the decoy pool).
Finally, four of the participants suggest that rather than
deleting a sensitive post, users can edit them and when they
become comfortable enough with the edits then they can
either delete it or just leave it on their profile. Participant
P62 wrote—“Altering the post completely and then delete
it. If tried to recover, the post would be completely different.”
Although post edits are not permitted in some of the social
platforms (e.g., Twitter), the automation of this procedure by
the platforms can be an interesting future work.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we observed that the majority of the users are
deleting their posts every day. There is a strong user-need for
ensuring deletion privacy in social platforms, as users consider
deletions a tool for removing sensitive, damaging, and embar-
rassing content. Further, using contextual integrity we demon-
strated the context-dependency of the rules for preserving
deletion privacy. The study identified that it is acceptable for
the users if the one-hop individuals (family members, friends)
on their social graphs become aware of their deletions but not
the large-scale data collecting actors (e.g., web-service data
collectors or the government). Furthermore, we showed that
selective deletions (the current deletion mechanism offered by
many social platforms) are inefficient in providing protection
to the users’ deletions. Finally, we highlighted the key factors
that the future social platform designers should consider for
attracting the users while providing them deletion privacy.
References
[1] Youtomb. https://web.archive.org/web/
20141029040225/http://youtomb.mit.edu/.
[2] Americans’ complicated feelings about so-
cial media in an era of privacy concerns.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-
about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacy-
concerns/, 2018.
[3] Collection of deleted tweets & annoying content. https:
//twitter.com/fallaitpassuppr?lang=en, 2019.
[4] Educational attainment in the united states.
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2019/
demo/educational-attainment/cps-detailed-
tables.html, 2019.
[5] 4chan. https://www.4chan.org/, 2020.
[6] Instagram stories. https://help.instagram.com/
1660923094227526, 2020.
[7] Politwoops. http://
politwoops.sunlightfoundation.com/, 2020.
[8] Prolific academic. https://www.prolific.ac/, 2020.
[9] Removeddit. http://removeddit.com/, 2020.
[10] Snapchat. https://www.snapchat.com/, 2020.
[11] Stackprinter. http://www.stackprinter.com/
deleted, 2020.
[12] Hazim Almuhimedi, Shomir Wilson, Bin Liu, Norman
Sadeh, and Alessandro Acquisti. Tweets Are Forever:
A Large-Scale Quantitative Analysis of Deleted Tweets.
In Proc. CSCW, 2013.
[13] Hazim Almuhimedi, Shomir Wilson, Bin Liu, Norman
Sadeh, and Alessandro Acquisti. Tweets are forever: a
large-scale quantitative analysis of deleted tweets. In
Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Computer sup-
ported cooperative work, pages 897–908, 2013.
[14] Noah Apthorpe, Yan Shvartzshnaider, Arunesh Mathur,
Dillon Reisman, and Nick Feamster. Discovering smart
home internet of things privacy norms using contextual
integrity. Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mo-
bile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, 2(2):1–23,
2018.
[15] Noah Apthorpe, Sarah Varghese, and Nick Feamster.
Evaluating the contextual integrity of privacy regulation:
Parents’ iot toy privacy norms versus {COPPA}. In 28th
{USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security
19), pages 123–140, 2019.
14
[16] Valerio Arnaboldi, Marco Conti, Andrea Passarella, and
Fabio Pezzoni. Analysis of Ego Network Structure in
Online Social Networks. In Proceedings of the 4th
ASE/IEEE International Conference on Social Com-
puting (SocialCom’12), Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
September 2012.
[17] Oshrat Ayalon and Eran Toch. Managing Longitudinal
Privacy in Online Social Networks. In Proc. SOUPS,
2013.
[18] Lujo Bauer, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri,
Michelle L. Mazurek, Michael K. Reiter, Manya Sleeper,
and Blase Ur. The Post Anachronism: The Temporal
Dimension of Facebook Privacy. In Proc. WPES, 2013.
[19] R. A. Hill and R. I. M. Dunbar. Social network size in
humans. Human Nature, 14(1), 2003.
[20] Paul Hitlin. Turkers in this canvassing: young, well-
educated and frequent users. P. Hitlin, Research in the
crowdsourcing age, a case study, pages 20–30, 2016.
[21] AW Kruglanski and DM Webster. Motivated closing
of the mind: “seizing” and “freezing”. Psychol Rev,
103(2):263–283, 1996.
[22] J. Richard Landis and Gary G. Koch. The Measurement
of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data. Biomet-
rics, 33(1):159–174, 1977.
[23] Sanam Ghorbani Lyastani, Michael Schilling, Michaela
Neumayr, Michael Backes, and Sven Bugiel. Is fido2
the kingslayer of user authentication? a comparative
usability study of fido2 passwordless authentication. In
41st IEEE Symposium on Secruity and Privacy (IEEE
S&P). Oakland Association, 2020.
[24] Mainack Mondal and Günce Su Yılmaz and Noah
Hirsch and Mohammad Taha Khan and Michael Tang
and Christopher Tran and Chris Kanich and Blase Ur
and Elena Zheleva. Moving Beyond Set-It-And-Forget-
It Privacy Settings on Social Media . In Proceedings of
the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS’19), 2019.
[25] Mohsen Minaei, Mainack Mondal, Patrick Loiseau, Kr-
ishna Gummadi, and Aniket Kate. Lethe: Conceal con-
tent deletion from persistent observers. Proceedings
on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2019(1):206–226,
2019.
[26] Mohsen Minaei, S Chandra Mouli, Mainack Mondal,
Bruno Ribeiro, and Aniket Kate. Deceptive deletions for
protecting withdrawn posts on social platforms. arXiv
preprint arXiv:2005.14113, 2020.
[27] Mainack Mondal, Johnnatan Messias, Saptarshi Ghosh,
Krishna P. Gummadi, and Aniket Kate. Forgetting in so-
cial media: Understanding and controlling longitudinal
exposure of socially shared data. In USENIX SOUPS
’16.
[28] Mainack Mondal, Johnnatan Messias, Saptarshi Ghosh,
Krishna P. Gummadi, and Aniket Kate. Forgetting in
Social Media: Understanding and Controlling Longitudi-
nal Exposure of Socially Shared Data. In Proc. SOUPS,
2016.
[29] Mainack Mondal, Johnnatan Messias, Saptarshi Ghosh,
Krishna P. Gummadi, and Aniket Kate. Longitudinal
Privacy Management in Social Media: The Need for
Better Controls. IEEE Internet Computing, 21(3):48–
55, 2017.
[30] Helen Nissenbaum. Privacy in Context: Technology, Pol-
icy, and the Integrity of Social Life. Stanford University
Press, 2010.
[31] Eyal Peer, Laura Brandimarte, Sonam Samat, and
Alessandro Acquisti. Beyond the turk: Alternative plat-
forms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 70:153–163, 2017.
[32] Manya Sleeper, Justin Cranshaw, Patrick Gage Kelley,
Blase Ur, Alessandro Acquisti, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and
Norman Sadeh. “I Read My Twitter the Next Morning
and Was Astonished”: A Conversational Perspective on
Twitter Regrets. In Proc. CHI, 2013.
[33] Ramine Tinati, Aastha Madaan, and Wendy Hall. In-
stacan: Examining deleted content on instagram. In
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Web Science Confer-
ence, pages 267–271, 2017.
[34] Qiaozhi Wang, Hao Xue, Fengjun Li, Dongwon Lee, and
Bo Luo. # donttweetthis: Scoring private information
in social networks. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies, 2019(4):72–92, 2019.
[35] Yang Wang, Gregory Norcie, Saranga Komanduri,
Alessandro Acquisti, Pedro Giovanni Leon, and Lor-
rie Faith Cranor. “I Regretted the Minute I Pressed
Share”: A Qualitative Study of Regrets on Facebook. In
Proc. SOUPS, 2011.
[36] Lu Zhou, Wenbo Wang, and Keke Chen. Tweet properly:
Analyzing deleted tweets to understand and identify re-
grettable ones. In Proceedings of the 25th International
Conference on World Wide Web (WWW’16), 2016.
[37] Lu Zhou, Wenbo Wang, and Keke Chen. Tweet properly:
Analyzing deleted tweets to understand and identify re-
grettable ones. In Proceedings of the 25th International
Conference on World Wide Web, pages 603–612, 2016.
15
A Appendix
Table 8: Demographics
US # (%) Europe # (%)
Gender
Female 48 (52%) 49 (50%)
Male 42 (46%) 49 (50%)
Other 2 (2%) —
Age
18 - 24 29 (31%) 22 (22%)
25 - 34 36 (39%) 39 (40%)
35 - 44 18 (19%) 21 (21%)
45 - 54 4 (4%) 12 (12%)
55 - 64 4 (4%) 3 (3%)
65 - 74 1 (1%) 1 (1%)
Education
Bachelor degree 35 (38%) 34 (35%)
Some college—no degree 20 (22%) 22 (22%)
Graduate degree 15 (16%) 20 (20%)
High school degree 11 (12%) 15 (15%)
Associate degree 10 (11%) 4 (4%)
Less than high school 1 (1%) 2 (2%)
Prefer not to answer — 1 (1%)
Marital Status
Single, never married 55 (60%) 49 (50%)
Married/domestic partner 31 (34%) 44 (45%)
Divorced 4 (4%) 4 (4%)
Separated 2 (2%) —
Prefer not to answer — 1 (1%)
Employment
Full-time employment 40 (43%) 52 (53%)
Part-time employment 17 (18%) 13 (13%)
Unemployed 14 (15%) 6 (6%)
Student 11 (12%) 17 (17%)
Other 4 (4%) 2 (2%)
Full time uncompensated 4 (4%) 5 (5%)
Retired 2 (2%) 2 (2%)
Prefer not to answer — 1 (1%)
Income
$0 - $19,999 9 (10%) 22 (22%)
$20,000 - $39,999 18 (20%) 26 (26%)
$40,000 - $59,999 14 (15%) 16 (16%)
$60,000 - $79,999 15 (16%) 13 (13%)
$80,000 - $99,999 9 (10%) 7 (7%)
$100,000 or more 23 (25%) 5 (5%)
Prefer not to answer 4 (4%) 9 (9%)
Background in IT
Yes 29 (32%) 31 (31%)
No 62 (67%) 66 (67%)
Prefer not to answer 1 (1%) 1 (1%)
16
anyone
family
friend
coworker
company
government
recipient
self
family members
friends
coworkers
null
su
b
je
ct
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.3 -0.3 -1.0
1.0 1.1 1.3 1.0 -0.1 -0.6
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.5 -0.2
1.0 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.1 -0.3
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6
checking/observing
interacted
nulltr
an
sm
is
si
on 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.1 -0.1
1.3 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.5 -0.3
0.6 1.0 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -0.5
Post did not get
enough attention
Spelling/Grammar
New job
New relationship
R.R./Political
Irrelevant due to time
Sexual
Drug/Alcohol
Violence/Cursing
at
tr
ib
u
te
0.3 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 -0.4
1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.6 -0.2
1.3 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.2 -0.2
0.9 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.0 -0.4
0.8 0.5 0.9 0.8 -0.1 -0.3
0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.3 -0.3
1.0 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.2 -0.3
1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.1 -0.2
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.1 -0.3
(a) US
anyone
family
friend
coworker
company
government
recipient
0.7 1.2 1.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.4
1.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.0
1.1 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.1
1.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.2
0.8 1.3 1.4 0.7 -0.3 -0.4
0.8 1.2 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.7
1.1 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.3
1.0 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.2
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0
1.6 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.2
1.1 1.5 1.3 0.5 0.2 -0.0
0.9 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.3 -0.1
0.7 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.1 -0.1
1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.6 -0.1
1.0 0.9 0.9 0.4 -0.1 -0.2
1.0 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.1 -0.3
1.0 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.0 -0.3
(b) Europe
−2.0
−1.5
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
A
ve
ra
ge
A
cc
ep
ta
b
ili
ty
S
co
re
Figure 6: Average acceptability scores of information flows grouped by recipients and subjects, transmission principles,
attributes, gender, age, or background IT information. Scores range from -2 (completely unacceptable) to 2 (completely
acceptable).
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